Abstract-An algorithm for anonymous sharing of private data among parties is developed. This technique is used iteratively to assign these nodes ID numbers ranging from 1 to . This assignment is anonymous in that the identities received are unknown to the other members of the group. Resistance to collusion among other members is verified in an information theoretic sense when private communication channels are used. This assignment of serial numbers allows more complex data to be shared and has applications to other problems in privacy preserving data mining, collision avoidance in communications and distributed database access. The required computations are distributed without using a trusted central authority.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE popularity of internet as a communication medium whether for personal or business use depends in part on its support for anonymous communication. Businesses also have legitimate reasons to engage in anonymous communication and avoid the consequences of identity revelation. For example, to allow dissemination of summary data without revealing the identity of the entity the underlying data is associated with, or to protect whistle-blower's right to be anonymous and free from political or economic retributions [1] . Cloud-based website management tools [2] provide capabilities for a server to anonymously capture the visitor's web actions. The problem of sharing privately held data so that the individuals who are the subjects of the data cannot be identified has been researched extensively [3] . Researchers have also investigated the relevance of anonymity and/or privacy in various application domains:
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS.2012.2235831 patient medical records [4] , electronic voting [5] , e-mail [6] , social networking [7] , etc.
Another form of anonymity, as used in secure multiparty computation, allows multiple parties on a network to jointly carry out a global computation that depends on data from each party while the data held by each party remains unknown to the other parties [8] , [9] . A secure computation function widely used in the literature is secure sum that allows parties to compute the sum of their individual inputs without disclosing the inputs to one another. This function is popular in data mining applications and also helps characterize the complexities of the secure multiparty computation [10] , [11] .
This work deals with efficient algorithms for assigning identifiers (IDs) to the nodes of a network in such a way that the IDs are anonymous using a distributed computation with no central authority. Given nodes, this assignment is essentially a permutation of the integers with each ID being known only to the node to which it is assigned. Our main algorithm is based on a method for anonymously sharing simple data and results in methods for efficient sharing of complex data. There are many applications that require dynamic unique IDs for network nodes [12] . Such IDs can be used as part of schemes for sharing/dividing communications bandwidth, data storage, and other resources anonymously and without conflict. The IDs are needed in sensor networks for security or for administrative tasks requiring reliability, such as configuration and monitoring of individual nodes, and download of binary code or data aggregation descriptions to these nodes. An application where IDs need to be anonymous is grid computing where one may seek services without divulging the identity of the service requestor [13] .
To differentiate anonymous ID assignment from anonymous communication, consider a situation where parties wish to display their data collectively, but anonymously, in slots on a third party site. The IDs can be used to assign the slots to users, while anonymous communication [6] , [14] can allow the parties to conceal their identities from the third party.
In another application, it is possible to use secure sum to allow one to opt-out of a computation beforehand on the basis of certain rules in statistical disclosure limitation [15] or during a computation [16] and even to do so in an anonymous manner. However, very little is known with respect to methods allowing agencies to opt-out of a secure computation based on the results of the analysis, should they feel that those results are too informative about their data [17] .
The work reported in this paper further explores the connection between sharing secrets in an anonymous manner, distributed secure multiparty computation and anonymous ID assignment. The use of the term "anonymous" here differs from its meaning in research dealing with symmetry breaking and leader election in anonymous networks [18] , [19] . Our network is not anonymous and the participants are identifiable in that they are known to and can be addressed by the others.
Methods for assigning and using sets of pseudonyms, have been developed for anonymous communication in mobile networks [20] , [21] . The methods developed in these works generally require a trusted administrator, as written, and their end products generally differ from ours in form and/or in statistical properties. To be precise, with nodes the algorithms of this paper distribute a computation among the nodes generating a permutation of chosen with a uniform probability of from the set of all permutations of where will know only . Such a permutation can also be produced by algorithms designed for mental poker [22] . The algorithms for mental poker [23] are more complex and utilize cryptographic methods as players must, in general, be able to prove that they held the winning hand. Throughout this paper, we assume that the participants are semi-honest [10] , also known as passive or honest-but-curious, and execute their required protocols faithfully. Given a semi-honest, reliable, and trusted third party, a permutation can also be created using an anonymous routing protocol [6] , [14] . Despite the differences cited, the reader should consult [20] and consider the alternative algorithms mentioned above before implementing the algorithms in this paper. This paper builds an algorithm for sharing simple integer data on top of secure sum. The sharing algorithm will be used at each iteration of the algorithm for anonymous ID assignment (AIDA). This AIDA algorithm, and the variants that we discuss, can require a variable and unbounded number of iterations. Finitely-bounded algorithms for AIDA are discussed in Section IX. Increasing a parameter in the algorithm will reduce the number of expected rounds. However, our central algorithm requires solving a polynomial with coefficients taken from a finite field of integers modulo a prime. That task restricts the level to which can be practically raised. We show in detail how to obtain the average number of required rounds, and in the Appendix detail a method for solving the polynomial, which can be distributed among the participants.
II. A REVIEW OF SECURE SUM
Suppose that a group of hospitals with individual databases wish to compute and share only the average of a data item, such as the number of hospital acquired infections, without revealing the value of this data item for any member of the group. Thus, nodes have data items , and wish to compute and share only the total value . A secure sum algorithm allows the sum to be collected with some guarantees of anonymity. Again, we assume the semi-honest model of privacy preserving data mining [10] . Under this model, each node will follow the rules of the protocol, but may use any information it sees during the execution of the protocol to compromise security.
Should all pairs of nodes have a secure communication channel available, a simple, but resource intensive, secure sum algorithm can be constructed. In the following algorithm, it is useful to interpret the values as being integer on first reading: would compute the total of all the second round transmissions received, . Our choices for the "random" numbers are for illustration and are not realistic. For example, given that each data item was originally in the range 0 to 10, the total would be in the range 0 to 40, and choosing random numbers modulus 41 would be more appropriate.
In seeking to specify the security and privacy provided by our algorithms, we are indeed fortunate to have an abundance of definitions to choose from [24] , [25] , even when restricting ourselves with the semi-honest assumption. The choice of definition should be dependent on considerations such as whether private or cryptographically secured communications channels are used, etc. We follow the suggestion of a reviewer that a particular information theoretic definition of privacy be used. The central arguments of the proofs should remain useful when evaluating the algorithms with respect to other models of secure multiparty computation.
We will have need of some notational conventions. Note that given a function or sequence , its restriction to a subdomain is denoted by . For a function of two variables we will denote its restriction to the domain by . Using bracket notation the set is denoted by . We also may identify an indexed set with its set of indexing subscripts as in writing or even for the nodes when clear from the context. Suppose that a coalition of the nodes seeks to garner information about the private data of the other nodes . Since the parties are semi-honest, the possibly useful outside information available to a coalition seeking to garner the private information of other parties, consists of only the random numbers in the messages received from those parties , the partial sums and the total . We view the algorithm at a valid completion meaning that the relations between , , and established by Algorithm 1 are satisfied. It is evident that the coalition, learns nothing. Table I an example with shows two corresponding outcomes with and (8, 9, 5) respectively with the values adjusted as specified in the proof. Items known by are in boldface. Interpreting all entries modulus 41 is required to actually meet the conditions of the theorem.
More formally, let denote the conditional probability distribution computed by a distributed protocol where is the distribution of inputs provided by the parties respectively, and similarly the outputs known to the respective parties are . For privacy nothing additional about should be learned by an adversary whose view of the computation includes all information known by the coalition including and any random values generated by or messages passed to or from coalition members. Denoting the conditional mutual Shannon information between and given by [26] define: Definition 1 (Subset Collusion Resistance): The algorithm computing the conditional probability will be said to be subset collusion resistant to the set of semi-honest parties provided that:
Thus, in the above definition, privacy is preserved if an adversary possessing the collective information of the coalition can learn nothing beyond that by observing the algorithm-loosely that and are independent of each other when is factored out. Because the outputs must be generated by any protocol implementing the function, they are included in the view . It can be useful to add global information explicitly to the definition, but it is not necessary for our results. If a protocol/algorithm is subset collusion resistant for all subsets of size or less, then it is said to be -private.
Theorem 2 (Secure Sum is -Private):
The secure sum method of Algorithm 1 is resistant to the collusion of any subset of the participating nodes, where the data values are from a finite abelian group.
For use in the following proof, two applications of the chain rule for conditional information suffice to show that . We also use [27] . Proof: The cases are vacuously true. Since all parties are semi-honest, we may take . Because can be calculated from , and from and , this reduces to and we compute:
where the information processing inequality [28, p. 541], with probabilistic functions for conditional mutual information is used in showing the inequality above. That follows from Theorem 1.
The secure sum algorithm just given remains N-private even when the input data are known as a multiset to all parties. We term this input permutation collusion resistance as the coalition knows the data held by the remaining parties only as a multiset. Because the parties are semi-honest, it does not matter if the values are known a priori or a posteriori. In the preceding proof, given that the multiset of values is known, the input distribution simply requires that the revised values be a permutation of the original values, and that proof, as well as, more directly, the proof of Theorem 1, hold with this restricted choice. This yields a trivial result which will, nonetheless, be of importance in the sequel:
Corollary 3 (Secure Sum Hides Permutations): The secure sum method of Algorithm 1 is input permutation resistant to the collusion of any subset of the participating nodes.
Other secure sum algorithms [16] , [29] certainly can be used with physically or cryptographically secured communications channels. For example, it is easy to see that secure sum using a single Hamiltonian cycle [10] is input permutation collusion resistant provided that the coalition is trapped in a connected region of the cycle. Such results can also be extended to provide privacy guarantees for the algorithms in subsequent sections should they utilize, e.g., a Hamiltonian cycle based secure sum. The secure sum technique can be employed with finite abelian groups other than such as .
III. TRANSMITTING SIMPLE DATA WITH POWER SUMS
Suppose that our group of nodes wishes to share actual data values from their databases rather than relying on only statistical information as shown in the previous section. That is, each member of the group of nodes has a data item which is to be communicated to all the other members of the group. However, the data is to remain anonymous. We develop a collusion resistant method for this task using secure sum as our underlying communication mechanism. Our data items are taken from a, typically finite, field . In the usual case, each will be an integer value and will be the field where is a prime number satisfying for all . Thus, arithmetic will typically be performed using modulus , but other fields will also be used.
Algorithm 2 (Anonymous Data Sharing With Power Sums):
Given nodes each holding a data item from a finitely representable field , make their data items public to all nodes without revealing their sources.
1) Each node computes over the field for . The nodes then use secure sum to share knowledge of the power sums:
2) The power sums are used to generate a polynomial which has as its roots using Newton's Identities as developed in [30] . Representing the Newton polynomial as (1) the values are obtained from the equations:
3) The polynomial is solved by each node, or by a computation distributed among the nodes, to determine the roots . The power sums can be collected and shared using a single round of secure sum by sending them as an array and applying the method to the vectors transmitted and received. The power sums are symmetric functions, and thus no association is made between and the value of . However, nonetheless, the information contained in these sums can be used to find the values of the data items . The choice , chosen for consistency with [31] , may be replaced by or any other nonzero value. Also, note that in the typical case, the solution for the requires finding the multiplicative inverse of the coefficients modulo . While the Euclidean algorithm could be used, the inverses can easily be computed in the order by the formulae:
After the integer division with remainder , will already be known, since . Table II . Solving each of the Newton identities (2) in turn yields , , . , and , and thus the polynomial of (1) is All the nodes receive the values , , , and and can compute the polynomial and its roots to recover the original data items, 2, 6, 6, and 10, but not their indices.
There are, of course, many methods available to accomplish the solution of the polynomial . A simple method which proved fast in practice is given in the Appendix.
In the sharing procedure, each node adds a vector to the secure sum. The vector can be regarded as a single integer in a very high radix. However, note that the multiset of values becomes known to all participants. The protection of the values against collusion is dependent upon the version of secure sum used and the particular set of colluding parties (and not merely the size of that set). We content ourselves with observing:
Theorem 4 (Power Sum Data Sharing is -Private):
The data sharing method of Algorithm 2 is resistant to the collusion of any subset of the participating nodes when based on the secure sum Algorithm 1.
Because the input data is present as a multiset in the output of every party and all parties are semi-honest the result is implied by our previous discussions of the secure sum Algorithm 1. The data sharing is anonymous in the sense that the sources of the data items cannot be traced. Of course, it is possible that a given data value would make sense only for a certain participant due to some factor such as the relative sizes of the participants. The paper [16] shows how anonymous opt-out can be used to address some of these concerns.
IV. SHARING COMPLEX DATA WITH AIDA Now consider the possibility that more complex data is to be shared amongst the participating nodes. Each node has a data item of length -bits which it wishes to make public anonymously to the other participants.
As the number of bits per data item and the number of nodes becomes larger, the method of the previous section becomes infeasible. Instead, to accomplish this sharing, we will utilize an indexing of the nodes. Methods for finding such an indexing are developed in subsequent sections. Assume that each node has a unique identification (ID) or serial number . Further, suppose that no node has knowledge of the ID number of any other node, and that are a random permutation of . This, again, is termed an Anonymous ID Assignment (AIDA) [16] .
Such an AIDA may be used to assign slots with respect to time or space for communications or storage. It may be possible to simply have a database with central storage locations such that each node simply stores its data there setting . This could occur if there was a trusted central authority, or if the storage operation was untraceable [6] , [14] . Given that there is no central authority (the situation for which secure sum was designed), secure sum can be used to accomplish the desired data sharing. Let be a vector of -bits. Each node creates a data item of -bits. Numbering each of the , -bit components we have:
The secure sum algorithm, given earlier in this paper, may now be used to collect the data items . The algorithm is applied using as the abelian group. The group operation is bitwise exclusive-or, and each node will choose random entries , each composed of randomly chosen bits while calculating one entry, e.g., to ensure sum (by XOR) equal to .
V. HOW TO FIND AN AIDA
We present a simple algorithm for finding an AIDA which has several variants depending on the choice of the data sharing method at step (3) below. At one step, random integers or "slots" between 1 and are chosen by each node. A node's position will be determined by its position among the chosen slots, but provisions must be made for collisions. The parameter should be chosen so that . TABLE III  TRACE OF AN AIDA ALGORITHM EXECUTION random number choices 6, 10, 6, 2 again in the first round. The choices of and are 5 and 6 respectively in the second round while and choose 0 as they will already have indices assigned at that point. A trace of critical steps in the procedure is shown in Table III 
The number of rounds this algorithm takes is modeled by a Markov chain. While no absolute upper bound is possible, we will see in Section VII that the performance is very good, as one might expect, when is much larger than N. The various methods for sharing the random numbers at step (3) are addressed in Section VI.
The collusion resistance of AIDA depends upon the underlying secure sum algorithm used and the collusion resistance of that algorithm for a particular set of colluding nodes . The strongest result possible can be obtained by using our simple, but inefficient, secure sum Algorithm 1:
Theorem 5 (AIDA is -Private): Algorithm 3 is resistant to the collusion of any subset of the participating nodes when the secure sum method of Algorithm 1 is used.
Proof: We sketch the essential step of the proof by viewing the AIDA algorithm at its final termination. Suppose that there are M iterations of steps (2)-(6). Let denote the random values chosen by nodes at step (2) in iteration . Denote by the final permutation produced by AIDA.
Let denote any permutation of . Suppose that the random choices by node at iteration during execution had been rather than . This choice of random numbers would be equally likely and would have resulted in the final assignment . Let denote the coalition of colluding nodes and the remaining nodes. Given any desired permutation , define
The selection yields
Thus all permutations of the values are equally likely and this is independent of the number of iterations.
Setting to be the empty set, we have shown: Corollary 6 (AIDA Produces Random Permutations): Algorithm 3 results in a permutation of the participating nodes chosen from the uniform distribution (all assignments are equally likely) when the secure sum method of Algorithm 1 is used. In the previous section the algorithm to find an AIDA required that the random numbers be shared anonymously at step (3). We now look at three methods which are variants of that procedure. The parameter must be chosen in each case. The expected number of rounds depends only on the selection of and not on the variant chosen.
A. Slot Selection AIDA
The slot selection method was developed in [16] where a more detailed explanation may be found. In this variant of the AIDA algorithm, each node submits the euclidean basis vector , zero except for a single one in component , to a secure sum algorithm. A node which has received an assignment in a previous round, however, submits the zero vector. The sum of these vectors is computed over the abelian group using a secure sum algorithm. The random numbers chosen and their multiplicities are simple to determine as .
Example 4 (A Slot Selection AIDA):
With the choice the AIDA example from the previous section would have executions of secure sum at each round with results as shown in Table IV . Using our example secure sum algorithm vectors of random numbers (not shown) would need to be chosen by each of the participating nodes at each round.
This variant of the algorithm has as its main drawback the very long message lengths that are encountered when using large to keep the number of expected rounds small.
B. Prime Modulus AIDA
A prime is chosen. Generally, will be chosen as small as possible subject to this restriction. The random numbers chosen are distributed at step (3) as in Section III using the field to compute the required power sums, the Newton polynomial , and the polynomial roots. This variant will be seen to result in shorter message lengths for communication between nodes. Again, the computation required to find the roots of the Newton polynomial is addressed in the Appendix. However, note that this computation can be delayed and thus overlaps any additional required rounds. 
C. Sturm's Theorem AIDA
It is possible to avoid solution of the Newton polynomial entirely. Sturm's theorem [32] allows the determination of the number of roots of a real polynomial in an interval based on the signs of the values of a sequence of polynomials derived from . The sequence of polynomials is obtained from a variant of the Euclidean Algorithm.
As in the previous variant, the power sums are collected and the Newton Polynomial is formed. However, the field used for computation is the field of rational numbers . The test is again sufficient to determine whether or not has received an assignment. A computational advantage arises in that the nodes do not need to solve the Newton polynomial to determine the (now implicitly) shared values. Assume that is not a root of as has been factored out immediately if applicable. Each node which has received an assignment must count separately multiple roots and also forms . A multiple roots version of Sturm's theorem [32] is then applied to calculate the number of roots for the polynomial in the range, . (Note that itself is not a multiple root allowing application of the theorem.) The polynomial is a by-product of this computation. The same Sturm procedure is applied to thus obtaining a count of the multiple roots in the same range, . The index received by is then
The collected power sums are integers. To guarantee privacy, ideally, compute sums with Algorithm 2 using a field with greater than any possible value of . Our timings showed that using Sturm's theorem is not currently competitive with the various methods of polynomial solution using the "prime modulus" approach and runs twice as slow at best. Although we, therefore, do not give an example, the construction is straight forward. The application of Sturm's theorem requires use of an ordered field resulting in large polynomial coefficients. Unfortunately, we do not currently know of a computationally reasonable analog of this result which is usable over a finite field. However, some results in this direction are available [33] . 
D. Communications Requirements of AIDA Methods
We now consider the required number of data bits for each of the three variant methods just described. This is the number of data bits that would be transmitted in each packet by the secure sum algorithm introduced earlier. The required numbers of data bits are slightly overestimated by the formulae: Table V gives the number of required data bits for selected values of and . Header bits required by the transmission protocol, etc. are not included. Where the number of data bits required by the Sturm method is not competitive, a "-" has been entered to enhance readability of the table.
The computational requirements of the "slot selection" appear, at first, to be trivial. However, for every root that the "prime modulus" method must check, "slot selection" must input/output and check . This simple method can be recommended, for small and , when multiple rounds of the algorithm can be tolerated.
Computational time required by the "prime modulus" method grows with . For most of the entries in the table, the amount of time is trivial. At and the computation required becomes a consideration. Here, somewhat less than 0.03 seconds of CPU time were required using the method described in the Appendix. When was raised to 10,000,000 this increased to 9 seconds. The computation can be distributed across the participating nodes easily and efficiently with the expected nearly -fold reduction in wall clock time required for computation.
VII. THE COMPLETION RATE AFTER ROUNDS
Two nodes might make identical choices of random numbers, or slots as they will be termed in this section. One can only guarantee that a complete assignment of nodes using possibilities for slots or random number choices and rounds will occur with at least a desired probability . The parameter will usually be implicitly set to by its omission in this section.
The reader may observe that estimating the number of assignments made in one round is essentially the well-known birthday problem. This and similar approaches have been used to compute bounds for our problem and others [12] , [16] . However, to compute the expected number of assignments in rounds precisely, it is necessary to know the probability distribution of the assignments made in a single round, and not just the average number. We now show how to compute the probabilities . As a first step, consider the probability that a single round, starting with nodes and slots, results in assignments and slots with conflicts as those slots have been chosen by more that one node. Note that is the number of slots that no (zero) nodes have chosen. The recurrence relations (3) determine .
The formulae are derived by assuming that nodes have chosen slots and looking at the next choice. The th node is to choose a slot resulting in assignments and conflicts. The slot it chooses could be unassigned, already in conflict with multiple occupants, or already assigned with exactly one occupant. For example, in the last case, the number of assignments falls by one with probability where the configuration before the choice occurred with probability . After the additional choice, there are nodes, of which are assigned and the number of conflicted slots rises by 1 to .
More base conditions than are necessary have been given in the recursion relations (3). For efficiency, the values need to be cached during computation. However, we will need only to remember , the probability that beginning with nodes and slots, exactly assignments have been made after one round:
Let be the probability of assignments being made after rounds so that . Define to be a vector of entries, which may be interpreted as either row or column vectors, giving probabilities:
There is no entry for because a single collision results in . The matrix gives the transition probabilities for a single round of AIDA starting with nodes and ending with nodes yet to be assigned.
Note that across each row of the array, the number of unassigned nodes is the same. For example, all the probabilities in the second row are for a single collision. The equation for getting the vectors of probabilities for the next round from the previous round is then found by matrix multiplication.
For the conventional form of a Markov chain, transpose to get a right stochastic matrix whose rows each sum to 1.
Thus, the formulae (5) and (6) can be used to obtain the desired probability of termination in rounds. The probability of incomplete assignment in rounds will be denoted by . We have calculated these for small with values as high as and using floating point computation with 256 bit mantissas, and verified the results by simulation. We formally state:
Theorem 7: The completion rate of Algorithm 3 with nodes after rounds is given by Table VI gives values for percentages of incomplete assignments. Percentages are rounded up to three significant digits.
Example 6: For nodes, slots, and rounds, in (7), we show the probabilities for , 2, 1, 0 assignments in terms of the same for as given by the matrix calculation of (5). For the probability of a complete assignment is . This can be verified by multiplying the same matrix with the starting state as the column vector on the right showing that is simply the right-most column of . For the probability of a complete assignment is .
(7) The entries in the matrix are, of course, calculated from the recurrence relations. However, one can validate some of the entries indirectly. For example, suppose the four nodes each choose a number in the range 1-10 and no assignments are made. Let denote the number of combinations of items taken at a time. Then where the first term of the numerator is the number of ways in which all four numbers can be identical while the second term is the number of ways in which the four numbers can form two pairs of identical numbers.
An implementer would generally want to choose to provide a high completion rate within just a few rounds. The material in this section is the most direct way to determine such completion rates. Section VIII indicates how additional information is obtained using computer algebra techniques.
VIII. ALGEBRAIC COMPLETION STATISTICS
For many purposes, the formulae of Section VII provide a satisfactory answer. However, the rich literature on absorbing Markov chains and the availability of computer algebra packages provide many other possibilities for analysis. To determine a desirable value for the number of slots " " one can take advantage of the fact that the probabilities are representable as rational functions of the number of slots . In fact is the by the upper, left-hand corner of an infinite matrix . When is small, the entries, which have no discernible pattern, can be calculated by a computer algebra package from the recurrence relations yielding:
A. The Average Number of Rounds
Following standard methods for absorbing Markov chains [34] , we determine the average number of rounds required.
Let be the matrix formed by dropping the first row and the first column of which correspond to the absorbing state of the Markov chain (note the transposition). Given that is the by identity matrix, denote the fundamental matrix for the Markov chain [34] by:
is, interestingly, a lower-triangular, infinite matrix from which the upper-left by corner forms . Let denote a vector with all entries set to 1. The value of most interest from the standard theory [34] in our context is probably the last entry of the vector which is the average number of rounds the algorithm will take. Related statistics such as the variance of can be determined. One starting point would be the related work [35] 
B. Asymptotic Rates of Complete Assignments
Exact rates or somewhat simpler asymptotic bounds on the percentage of incomplete assignments for any given number of rounds can be obtained. The second-largest eigenvalue of the matrix gives the asymptotic rate at which the percentage of incomplete assignments decreases between rounds. However, more precise information is available.
Since is triangular, the eigenvalues are easy to determine and for parameters of interest the second-largest is . We restrict our attention to cases in which these eigenvalues are distinct. The only currently known exception is for the parameter, which yields the eigenvalue 1/81 twice. For parameters there are no other occurrences. In the presence of duplicate eigenvalues Perron's formula for matrix powers [36] can be used to obtain a similar analysis, albeit more complex. Instead, we suggest simply using a slightly decreased value of to obtain the bounds using the methods developed below should duplicate eigenvalues occur.
Using the matrix , is the spectral radius and Gelfand's formula yields the asymptotic rate of contraction . The sum of the entries of is 1 and thus:
Let denote the eigenvalues taken from the diagonal of and let denote the matrix composed of a basis of corresponding left eigenvectors as rows. Representing with respect to the eigenvector basis we arrive at (8) where " " indicates component-by-component multiplication of the two vectors. The formula transforms the starting state into the eigenvector basis where the multiplication by powers of the eigenvalues performs the equivalent of the transformation by . The result is then transformed back to euclidean coordinates and the probabilities of the incomplete states are tallied with the inner product using .
Collecting the terms of formula (8) above yields an expression for of the form (9) with result: Theorem 8: The expected percentage of incomplete assignments of nodes after rounds is: (9) where are the distinct eigenvalues from the diagonal of the truncated transition matrix , and are the solution of the linear equations:
(10) Note that the Vandermonde coefficient matrix can be ill-conditioned. Both special methods and explicit formulae exist for use in computing its inverse. It follows immediately that:
Corollary 9: The expected percentage of incomplete assignments of nodes after rounds is asymptotically:
where is computed by Theorem 8; i.e., the limit of the quotient of the approximately equal quantities is 1 as . The quantities and are implicitly functions of . Again, keeping a free variable is useful only for small .
Example 8 (Calculation of an Asymptotic Bound):
In Section VII using and , we already computed , , and . For subsequent use, we sort the entries from the diagonal of into descending order , , and . Substituting into (10) yields:
Solving these linear equations, gives the form of (9) for the exact average rate of incompletion:
Thus, we also obtain a simpler asymptotic rate for incomplete assignments of: This is seen to be an upper bound that rapidly converges:
IX. FINITE TERMINATION
Although the algorithms developed here terminate with probability 1, there is no absolute upper bound on the number of rounds required. Under some assumptions, it has been proven that finite termination cannot be guaranteed for the simpler leader election problem [18] , [19] . While there may be extreme conditions under which no algorithm for AIDA can be guaranteed to finitely terminate, we conjecture only that at least sequential communications are required in such an algorithm. On the other hand, the algorithms of [20] , [21] are already collision free, but do not generate a permutation chosen at random from all possible permutations. For the current problem, the number of rounds is typically small and we do not recommend seeking finitely bounded termination.
For completeness, we sketch a cryptographic approach, that could guarantee finitely bounded termination, even without a trusted authority. (Note that some mental poker algorithms [23] could also be used to make this guarantee.) Suppose each node has a unique, but not anonymous identifier , then the numbers are unique where is an encryption function, and is the usual sufficiently long seed (random number) known only to . The function may be cooperatively generated with inverse unknown to the nodes individually using techniques from [37] . The use of these random numbers at step (2) of Algorithm 3 would guarantee termination in a single round. However, polynomial solution for of the required size is impractical. The computational problems with this approach can be overcome by using the numbers as pseudorandom bit streams in Algorithm 3. Each node takes bits from the head of its bit stream at each round to form . Two problems arise. First, nodes drawing identical random numbers in a round must add their position in the list of random numbers generated in that round to the tail of their bit stream. This keeps all the bit streams distinct. Second, the analysis of the number of rounds required in Sections VII and VIII no longer applies a priori unless the encryption function has the difficult to obtain plausible deniability property [38] . However, provided that , the bit strings become shorter at each round and a fixed bound is easily calculated.
X. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Each algorithm compared in Section VI can be reasonably implemented and each has its advantages. Our use of the Newton identities greatly decreases communication overhead. This can enable the use of a larger number of "slots" with a consequent reduction in the number of rounds required. The solution of a polynomial can be avoided at some expense by using Sturm's theorem. The development of a result similar to the Sturm's method over a finite field is an enticing possibility.
With private communication channels, our algorithms are secure in an information theoretic sense. Apparently, this property is very fragile. The very similar problem of mental poker was shown to have no such solution [22] with two players and three cards. The argument of [22] can easily be extended to, e.g., two sets each of colluding players with a deck of cards rather than our deck of cards. In contrast to bounds on completion time developed in previous works, our formulae give the expected completion time exactly. We conjecture the asymptotic formula of Corollary 9, based on computational experience, to be a true upper bound.
All of the noncryptographic algorithms have been extensively simulated, and we can say that the present work does offer a basis upon which implementations can be constructed. The communications requirements of the algorithms depend heavily on the underlying implementation of the chosen secure sum algorithm. In some cases, merging the two layers could result in reduced overhead.
APPENDIX
The polynomials that must be solved are always of the form where is a constant. Thus, there are exactly roots in , counting multiplicities. (Note that all formulae in this appendix are modulus .) Algorithms such as Berlekamp [39] and Cantor-Zassenhaus [40] are implemented in computer algebra packages and were compared with the simple method developed below. A custom implementation of one of these methods might be faster, but as tested, they were at best 2.7 times slower for our selected values of and .
Following [41] , we use a method well-known in computer graphics to simply evaluate the polynomial at all values to find its roots. This method also has the merit of being a task which is easily distributed among the nodes. With and less than 0.03 seconds of CPU time were required for the nondistributed version (2.2 GHz processor). However, the computation time is less than 0.0004 seconds CPU time per node when distributed among the 100 nodes. For an extreme case, with and , Horner's rule needed 316 seconds versus 9 seconds of single processor CPU time for our implementation.
Newton Extrapolation Evaluation for Finding Roots: To use the Newton extrapolation formula [42] , the polynomial must first be represented with respect to the Newton (backward) basis polynomials. Our computations will use the formulae specialized for consecutive integers. Let designate the basis Newton polynomials constructed at the values .
The Newton polynomial for is then given by
The backward repeated differences are computed by:
During the first phase of the algorithm, computing , and then using the recursive formulae above yields values for . Since is a polynomial of degree , , a constant, for all . This fact allows the computation of from during the second phase of the algorithm by means of the formulae: (13) Thus, we have the initially found values with and we proceed to compute these values for in succession. At each iteration a root is found if . The complexity of the algorithm is effectively , when additions modulus are performed in unit time.
Deflation by a Root: We gain an approximately two-fold speedup with our own method to deflate the polynomial when a root is found.
During the second phase of the algorithm, suppose that a root is found and that a deflation occurs. Then, let our Newton coefficients be represented by and for and respectively. That is a root implies . The values are computed from the values by:
Here since . These relations are obtained by dividing the formula for expressed as a Newton polynomial by and equating coefficients. Coding the Polynomial Solution Algorithm: The algorithm was coded using the programming language C and tested using several different compilers and computers. It is assumed that any zero roots have been eliminated by shifting of coefficients. We use a single array to contain the values . The array is initialized with the values The first set of values for are found by taking recursive differences as developed in (12) . This task is accomplished by the following code:
The values are found by the following code from those for according to the formulae (13).
The entry contains at each iteration. When is zero, the polynomial is deflated by:
where is looked up in a table. Control returns to the repeat-until loop when . The last two code segments above both contain the test . We eliminated an if-then-else structure in favor of the two separate tests in order to create a smaller innermost loop. This doubled the execution speed. Introducing registers to contain and and rearranging the code to test rather than in the inner loop also provided gains in speed. Use of optimization options in compilation did reduce runtime, but did not obviate the need for the noted coding changes. Our faith in the current generation of optimizing compilers has been slightly diminished.
